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Policy tools, especially tax instruments, can be designed to
increase revenues and at the same  time protect the poor. The au-
thors'  method of estimating the consequences of tox reform
shows, for example, that a value-added tax would make Paki-
stan's  tax system more buoyant and reduce the production
distortions inherent in Pakistan's current tax systerm-and not at
the expense of the poor.
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To what extent do rich or poor lose or gain from  Such changes increare the distortions caused
different tax reform packages?  Using estimates  by cascading, with adve,se effects on both
of directions of reform from Ahmad and Nicho-  exports and poor households.
las Stem (1988), Ahmad and Ludlow compare
the consequences of different options by analyz-  Country-specific administrative capabilities
ing actual patterns of consumption and produc-  must be considered in designing altemative tax
tion.  systems, but generally the VAT will be prefer-
able to a system of ad valorem retail sales
They illustrate, for policymakers, how  taxation. The retail sales tax also avoids cascad-
directions of reform might be evaluated without  ing but yields more uncertain revenue, than the
overly complicated models of the economy,  VAT, which is collected at each stage in the pro-
using the son of data now increasingly available  duction process, not just at the retail level.
- for example, household surveys being  Indeed, one option is to adopt a VAT at the
conducted by various World Bank divisions, and  import and manufacturing stages and at the
by statistical offices around the world.  wholesale level.
A country such as Pakistan, which relies on  A VAT also provides a better flow of
a narrow tax base - consisting primarily of  information-useful  in the collection of income
tariffs on intermediate goods and excises on  and corporate taxes, and in reducing distortions
domestic manufacturing-has  difficulty ensur-  in production decision-making.  A correctly
ing that the tax system keeps pace with the  designed consumption-based tax instrument
growth in national income and activity, without  such as the value-added tax (VAT) can increase
frequent discretionary changes.  the tax base and remove production distortions
- at the same time protecting the interests of
the poor.
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Developing  countries in the process of growth and structural
adjustment face requirements  for additional tax revenues.  There is,
moreover,  a concern  with protecting  the poor against  a deterioration  in
their  living  standards,  which  makes  it  imperative to examine the
distributional  consequences  of policy  options. In this  paper  we examine  a
method  of selecting  appropriate  rate structures,  with guidance  from the
recent  literature  on tax  reform,  and  of making  these  operational,  with the
effects  on different  types  of  households  being  spelt  out  in  some  detail.
A first step in the analysis  of reform  is to describe  existing
taxes,  arnd  the relationship  between the tax system  and prices  of final
goods.  One then examines  the consequences  of tax  changes  (and  thus  price
changes)  on  households,  resulting  government  revenues,  and  also
implications  for  production. For indirect  taxes,  th,is  yields  a ranking  of
commodities that are more or less attractive  candidates  for additional
taxation.  Note that this method involves neither the estimation of
"optimal  taxes"  nor the  use  of  a computable  general  equilibrium  model. For
_he most part the analysis  of  the  directions  of reform  utilizes  actual
patterns  of consumption  and  production. In this  paper  we use  computations
of directions  of reform  for Pakistan  based on Ahmad and Stern (1988)  to
guide  the choice  of alternative  tax reform  packages. The distributional
conse4uences  of these  alternatives  are  examined  further  in terms  of gainers
and losers  on the basis  of detailed  information  from  household  data sets
from Pakistan.  This provides  a method for translating  the analysis  of
reform  into  operationally  useful  options.-2
With a narrow  indirect-tax base,  Pakistan has  come to rely
increasingly  on revenue from customs duties combined  with excises on
domestic  production  to  meet continuing  demands  for  additional  resources. A
consequence  of this  tax structure  is a dependence  on high rates  of tax or
duty on a  limited set of commodities [see the Report of the National
Taxation  Reforms  Commission  (NTRC),  1987,  for  a detailed  discussion  of the
issues).  This li.mitation  of the availability  of tax instruments  is not
uncommon in developing  countries, and in the Pakistan  case reflects  a
structure of taxation essentially  inherited  from pre-independence  days.
Despite frequent rate changes the tax structure  has scarcely  evolved,
particularly  in terms  of coverage  and newer instruments. Tax collections
as a proportion  of GDP have oscillated  around  14% during  the 1980's  and
non-tax  revenues  were in the order  of 2% of GDP, on average,  during  this
period.  While revenues (including  both tax and non-tax  revenues)  were
generally  sufficient  to meet current  expenditures  until 1983 or so, and
there was usually a contribution  towards the developmental  budget, a
systematic  deficit  of current  expenditures  over revenues  has opened  up in
recent  years.
It  has  been  argued  that  commodities  such  as  wheat,  pulses,  tea  and
sugar are poor candidates for additional taxation if distributional
considerations  are important. The analysis  of refOru  iLvolves  evaluaLion
of additional  revenue  generation  in terms  of effects  on distribution,  as
well as on production  and incentives  (see  e.g. Ahmad and Stern 1984 and
1987  for  applications  to  India,  and  1987a  and  1988  for  directions  of reform
for  Pakistan). While the  classification  of goods  to be taxed  at a higher
rate  may  be difficult  in  some  instances  (see  e.g.,  Bird,  1987),  and  obvious
candidates  such as cosmetics  and tobacco  products  may  be also consumed  bythe  poor,  a  more detailed  examination  of the  distributional  characteristics
of these  goods  is often quite  useful,  since  this dominates  the  potential
directions  of reform.  For instance,  in Pakistan,  the tobacco  products
consumed  by the  poor  are  mainly  bidis,  which  bear little  tax,  and  which  are
different  from  processed  cigarettes  (that  are  highly  taxed). A value  added
tax (VAT),  supplemented  with selective  excises,  could  achieve  considerable
differentiation,  with  particular  final  goods  such  as cigarettes  (which  also
raise much  of the existing excise revenue) being  taxed heavily on
distributional,  revenue  and  paternalistic  grounds  (if  smoking  is considered
harmful for  health).  If the paternalistic  approach  dominates,  it may be
necessary  to tax  all tobacco,  although  the  evidence  against  bidis  may not
be as damning as against cigarettesl  In the final analysis,  what is
important  is the  structure  of the  overall  indirect  tax  system,  and in the
case described,  would  include  a joint  evaluation  of the  VAT and system  of
excises,  in terms  of  price  changes  and  effects  on  households.
A VAT is seen  as an instrument  which  could  lead  to an expansion  of
the  base  of taxation  for  a country  like  Pakistan,  and  this  has  been  adopted
in an increasing  number  of developing  countries  (see for instance  Tanzi,
1987).  This has the attractive  property  in that  taxes  raid on inputs  are
credited  against  the  tax  liability  on outputs,  thus avoiding the
distortions  arising  from  the  cascading  inherent  in t-he  present  system. The
two  major  considerations  with  a  VAT are  (i)  administration,  and  (ii)  design
of rate structure.  On  (i) there are the  issues of implementation
capability, and speed of introduction.  Despite its administrative
expertise,  the  Indian  Government  was forced  to  restrict  the  introduction  of
the  VAT to a replacement  of the central  excise  duties  (or  MANVAT),  since
under the Constitution  sales taxes come under the jurisdiction  of State-4-
Governments.  However, we do not go into the issue of jurisdictions,
administrative  authorities,  and  so on in  any  detail  here.  With  respect  to
(ii)  we ask  whether  there  are  conditions  under  which  a single,  uniform  rate
structure  might be desirable,  and relatedly,  what an "appropriate"  rate
structure  for the  VAT should  be, given  the  possibility  of differentiation
through  the  use  of excises.
The  design of  rate structure interacts witn administrative
considerations  and on these grounds  uniformity  of indirect  taxation  is
often  recommended. Deaton (1981)  (see  also Deaton  and Stern (1987),  and
the  discussion  in  Newbery  and Stern,  Chapter  2] discusses  conditions  under
which  uniform  taxation  might  be desirable  and  these  entail,  inter  alia,  the
provision of optimal lump-sum transfers, additive separability, and
identical  Engel  curves.  In practice,  however,  in the absence  of optimal
lump-sum  transfers,  a uniform structure  of indirect  taxation  is usually
regressive  (see  Ahmad  and Stern,  1987).  In this  paper  we experiment  with
various  alternative  rate  structures  including  exemptions  for  broad classes
of goods, and a treatment of both proportional  and differentiated  VAT
rates.
While  the illustrations  in this  paper  are  based on reforms  which
involve the introduction  of a VAT the method is general  and could be
applied  to any tax  change  resulting  in  price  changes. Thus the  tax  reform
options  chosen  in this  paper,  which  are  a combination  of selective  excises
and  the  VAT,  could  have  been  achieved,  for  instance,  by a retail  sales  tax.
The choice between a VAT and a rctail sales tax would be governed  by
administrative  considerations.  While the VAT  could be introduced in
stages,  at the  manufacturing  and  wholesale  levels  without  danger  of revenue-5-
loss in the first instance, there may not be adequate administrative
capability  for  making  a retail  sales  tax  workable. Further  advantages  of
the VAT  include  self policing  inc,  .tives,  as well as information  flows
which  could  improve  income  tax  collections  (Gil-Diaz,  1987).
An  illustration of the theory of reform and its operational
counterparts  are described  in Section  2.  Section  3 contains  the  empirical
investigations,  and  concluding  remarks  are  in Section  4.
2.  The  Directions  of  Reform
In this  section  we draw  on the  directions  of reform  based  cn  Ahmad
and Stern  (1988),  to  guile  the  choice  of tax-reform  vector  combinations  to
be evaluated  further  in terms  of  potential  gainers  and  losers.
For marginal changes at the status quo, the possibility of
welfare-improving  reforms  may be seen in terms of the social costs of
raising  a unit of governmeilt  revenue. The  marginal  social  cost associated
with  any  particular  indirect  tax  is  given  by the  welfare-weighted  impact  on
households  of a change  in the tax.  The size  of the increase  is given  by
the amount required  to raise an extra unit of revenue.  For relatively
undistorted  economies,  or where  shadow  prices  are  proportional  to producer
prices,  the  effects  on revenue  are  given  by actual  demands  and  the  response
of consumers  to the tax change.  However,  in most developing  countries,
market imperfections  and government  policy  lead to incentives  inherer.t  in
relative market prices facing producers to diverge substantially  from
relative  social  opportunity  costs. The theory  of reform  can  be generalized
to incorporate  the  divergence  between  shadow  prices  and  market  prices  (seeDreze and Stern,  1987, for theoretical  derivations,  and Ahmad and Stern,
1988,  for  examples  for  Pakistan).
The effects  of tax  changes  on  households,  or the  change  in  welfare
V,  may  be given  by the  expression:
aV/ati  - - Eh ph (xi)h,  ....  (1)
where (xi)h  is the demand  for  commodity  i by household  h, and the  ph are
welfare  weights  or value  judgements,  which  may be exogenously  determined.
We have defined  these  welfare  weights  in terms  of a transfer  of Rs.l to
household  h with income  Ih relative  to the  poorest  household,  with income
Ii, as (Ii/Ih)e,  where e is an inequality  aversion  parameter.  For e-O,
transfers  to all  households  are  equally  valuable,  but for  e > 0 transfeis
to  poorer  households  are  considered  more  valuable  than  to  richer  ones.  For
example  if Ih had twice  the  income  of Ii,  then  e - 1  would  imply  that  Rs.l
to the poorest  would  be worth twice  that to household  h, whereas e - 5
indicates  that a transfer  to the poorest  would  be worth 32 times  that to
household  h.
The amount  a given  tax  would  have to  be raised  to yield  one  unit
of  government  revenue,  in the  undistorted  case,  is given  by AR,  or
aR/ati  - Xi +  Ejtj(axj/ati).  ....  (2)
where  Xi is the  aggregate  consumption  of commodity  i, and (axj/ati)  is a
matrix  of uncompensated  aggregate  demand  derivatives. The  margiral  social
cost of raising a particular tax, defined as Ai [see  Ahmad and Stern(1984),  (1987)  and (1988)]  is  given  by AV/AR,  and  one  would  shift  taxation
from goods with high Ai to those with lower Aj.  Note that Ai may be
written as a combination  of the distributional  cha:-acteristic,  Di, and a
tax  elasticity,
Xi  - Di  /  - (".) l,  ...  (3)
|tixi  dti 
where  Di  may  be defined  as
Di  - 2  ph(xi)h/  Xi.  ....  (4)
Where  inequality  aversion  is  zero,  and  ph  - l (V  h),  clearly  Di  - 1 (V  i).
However,  for positive  inequality  aversion,  e >  0,  a rank order for the
distributional  characteristic  appears, and the rankings  of the Di are
fairly  stable (see Tables la and lb).  Thus "gur",  "wheat"  and "edible
oils"  rank  consistently  high  in  terms  of  their  distributional
characteristic,  and  "cigarettes", "beverages", and  "recreation and
transport"  relatively  low.
In the case of the  distorted economy, equation  (2) no longer
holds,  and  we need in  addition  to  the  l.h.s.,  a term  describing  the  effects
of the  divergence  between  market  prices  and  shadow  prices,
ej(pj  - vj)axj/ati  [for further  details  see Dreze and Stern,  (1987),  or
Ahmad  and  Stern  (1986,  1988)].
In Table 2, from  Ahmad and Stern  (1988),  we present  the  rankings
for the marginal  cost of raising  government  revenue  from the ith  good.
The two sets of rankings  for Al present  directions  of reform  when the
divergence  between  market  prices  and shadow  prices  is taken  into account.8 -
The shadow  prices  used reflect  a sensitivity  to alternative  valuations  of
wage and asset conversion  factors, incorporating  different  assumptions
about  distortions  in the Pakistan  labour  and capital  markets (see  Ahmad,
Coady and Stern,  1988, for further  details).  On the other hand the Ai
presents  the  directions  of reform  for  the,  hypothetical,  undistorted  case.
Note that,  for  higher  values  of e, the inequality  aversion  parameter,  the
three  sets  of  reform  directions  converge,  as  the  distributionea
characteristic  of the commodities  begins  to dominate  the results.  It is
apparent  that  commodities  with  a  high  ranking  distributional
characteristic,  e.g. w  at, are poor candidates  for increased  taxation,
provided one's inequality  aversion is positive.  For e - 0, or zero
inequality  aversion,  one  would  wish to tax  commodities  in inelastic  demand.
Under this criterion,  commodities  such as wheat would be fair game for
additional  taxation.
The analysis  of reform  suggests  that,  in general,  one would not
wish to introduce  uniform  proportional  taxation. Even  with zero  aversion
to inequality,  there  is  no clear  presumption  that  this  would  be desirable,
since  the effects  on the  production  structure  are still  important  and the
directions  of the  reform  are  particularly  sensitive  to the  specification  of
shadow  prices. With e - 0 in  the  undistorted  case [see  rankings  for  Ai in
Table  2], one  would  suggest  raising  the  '.  on wheat  relative  to rice,  or
in  the  direction  of  equality  of tax  rates,  this  result  is  reversed  when tax
changes  in the distorted  economy  are considered  [see  the rankings  for Ay
(e-O)  in  Table  2].
The  analysis  of the effects  of a tax  reform  specifically  requires
calculations  of 'effective  taxes'  on each commodity  [see  e.g. Ahmad andStern  (1986)  for  detailsl. The 'effective  tax',  te,  is the tax  element  in
the  price of the fi.  l good,  including  the taxation  of inputs,  inputs  to
those  inputs  and so on, and  may  be written  as (see  Ahmad  and  Stern,  1986,
for  details),
te  _ td(I  - Ad)-l  +  tmAm(I  - Ad)-l,  ....  (5)
where td is the vector of domestic taxes (excises  and sales taxes on
domestic  production),  and (I - Ad)-l  is the  Leontief  inverse  matrix.  The
term tmAm reflects the taxation of imported inputs Am used  in the
production  of domestic  goods.  If  p0 is the  existing  price  vector,  then  we
may  define  the  basic  price  (see  Stone,  1970),  pb as
pb - (po  - te).  ....  (6)
The basic  price may  be taken as representative  of the real
resource .osts  in the economy,  which are assumed  to be unchanged  by the
reform.  Replacing  the effective  tax vector  with v new set  of taxes,  tv,
results  in a  new  price  level,  pi,
pl - pb +  tv,  ....  (7)
and  the  change  in  price  is
sp  _ p  -po  _ tv  - te.  ....  (8)
The  change  in  prices  determines  the  distributional  consequences  of
the  reform.  In addition  to the "effective  taxes",  we require  information- 10  -
on consumption  patterns  of households.  In this paper we have used the
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) for 1984/5.  In the
empirical 'experiments',  we contrast the money loss or gain to each
household  in terms  of a  proposed  reform. The  money  gain/loss  to  households
would  be a function  of the price  change  and  pattern  of consumption  and  a
first round approximation  (assumil3  quantities  consumed  constant,  before
and  after  the  reform)  is
21
L  - h  Xipi,  ....  (9)
i-1
We have 16,575  households  in our sample,  and for the  analysis  we
use  a 21-commodity  aggregation  to  match  with tax  categories.  For  small  tax
changes,  L is a money  measure  of the reform  to  household  h.  This may be
expressed,  using the equivalent  variation  Eh, as the utility change  for
household  h, Vhl - VhO ,  where Vh is the indirect  utility  function  for
household  h at time  0 or 1.  The equivalent  variation  is defined  using  the
implicit  function:
Vhl  - Vh  (pO,  ,h  +  Eh),  ....  (10)
where Mh is the income  of household  h at time 0.  Eh is the  money that
would  be given  to household  h, at pre-reform  prices,  to reach  post-reform
utility levels, and may be written explicitly  using the expenditure
function  eh( )
Eh  - eh (pO,  Vhl) - Mh.  ....  (11)- 11  -
While it is clear that one cannot  expect  quantities  consumed  to
remain  constant  subsequent  to a major  reform,  if only because this  would
imply  a  violation  of the  budget  constraint  for  a number  of  households,  L is
still  of value in that it describes  possible  first  round  effects,  and is
more robust  in that it uses actual  consumption  data without  resorting  to
the use of fitted values implicit  in the analysis  based on equivalent
variations.
Note that  while  the  introduction  of a  VAT is  a major  reform  in the
administrative  sense,  it  would  not  be considered  a reform  in terms  of the
effects on households if p1 - p0,  and the vector of effective taxes
remained  unchanged.  The reforms  we discuss  reflect  either marginal  or
major changes  in effective  taxes  and in general  6p f  0.  However a VAT
introduction  might qualify  as a marginal  reform  if 6p is small.  On the
other hand a revenue-neutral  reform  could  be considred major if 6p is
large.
The data requirements  for the evaluation  of a major reform  are
quite stringent  (see for instance  the discussions  in Newbery  and Stern,
1987,  particularly  the  chapters  by Deaton  and  by Ahmad  and Stern). Major
price  changes would  require the specification  of utility and demand
functions for each household, rather than the use of aggregate  demand
responses  and  actual  consumptions  as in  the  marginal  reform  case.
In the  evaluation  of major  reforms,  we estimate  demand  parameters
for  quintiles  in  both rural  and  urban  areas  for  Pakistan  using  an extended
Linear Expenditure  System (ELES),  with the 1984/5  HIES [see  Ahmad and
Ludlow,  (1987)  for a description  of the  method]. The  equivalent  variation- 12 -
Table  la  Distributional  Characteristics
e-0  e-0.5  e-1.0  e-2.0  e-5.0
Wheat  1  0.5649  0.3549  0.1772  0.0645
Rice  1  0.5159  0.2991  0.1301  0.0359
Pulses  1  0.5271  0.3131  0.1442  0.0470
Maize  1  0.5151  0.2959  0.1244  0.0305
Meat  1  0.4424  0.2283  0.0853  0.0193
Milk  1  0.4967  0.2799  0.1176  0.0316
Veg/Fruit/Spices  1  0.4895  0.2755  0.1178  0.0341
Edoils  1  0.5261  0.3135  0.1458  0.0485
Sugar  1  0.5036  0.2866  0.1216  0.0328
Cur  1  0.5951  0.3863  0.1994  0.0744
Confectionary  1  0.4049  0.1936  0.0649  0.0130
Tea  1  0.4963  0.2811  0.1199  0.0338
Beverages  1  0.3451  0.1406  0.0349  0.0030
Cigarettes  1  0.4522  0.2375  0.0904  0.0205
Bidis  1  0.5050  0.2890  0.1248  0.0363
Housing  1  0.4459  0.2359  0.0948  0.0264
Clothing  1  0.4883  0.2758  0.1194  0.0355
Hygiene  &  Medicines  1  0.4660  0.2538  0.1044  0.0288
Recreation  & Transport 1  0.3665  0.1641  0.0524  0.0104
Other  Food  1  0.3950  0.1892  0.0660  0.0138
Other  Non-Food  1  0.3901  0.1851  0.0640  0.0139
Table  lb  Ranking  of Distributional  Characteristics
e-0  e-0.5  e-l.0  e-2.0  e-5.0
Wheat  1  2  2  2  2
Rice  2  5  5  5  6
Pulses  3  3  4  4  4
Maize  4  6  6  7  12
Meat  5  16  16  16  16
Milk  6  9  10  12  11
Veg/Fruit/Spices  7  11  12  11  8
Edoils  8  4  3  3  3
Sugar  9  8  8  8  10
Gur  10  1  1  1  1
Confectionary  11  17  17  18  19
Tea  12  10  9  9  9
Beverages  13  21  21  21  21
Cigarettes  14  14  14  15  15
Bidis  15  7  7  7  7
Housing  16  15  15  14  14
Clothing  17  12  11  10  7
Hygiene  & Medicines  18  13  13  13  13
Recreation  & Transport 19  20  20  20  20
Other  Food  20  18  18  17  18
Other  Non-Food  21  19  19  19  '7
Note:  The distributional characteristic (see equation 4) has been
estimated  using the 1984/5  Household  Income  and Expenditure  Survey for
Pakistan. e is an inequality  aversion  parameter,  defined  in  the  text.Table  2  Directions  of  Reform  in  the  Distorted  Economy  kV  and  for  effective  taxes  Ai
Ranks  )Y  Ranks  XV  Ranks  Xi
WCF  0.9;  ACF  0.76  WCF  0.75;  ACF  0.6
*=0  0.6  1.0 2.0  6.0  e  =  0  0.6  1.0 2.0 6.0  =0  0.6  1.0 2.0 6.0
Wheat  8  2  1  1  1  9  3  1  1  1  10  4  1  1  1
Rice  13  12  12  10  9  12  12  12  12  9  7  7  6  6  7
Pulses  7  3  2  2  2  S  4  2  2  2  S  6  3  2  2
Most/Egg  1  7  6  11  12  a  *  s  10  11  13  13  13  13  13
Milk  a  a  6  7  9  4  7  6  6  7  11  11  10  10  11
Vag.otc.  2  6  5  6  6  2  1  5  5  6  12  12  1111  9
Edibl-  Oils  11  11  11  a  7  11  11  11  11  6  I  1  4  4  4
Sugar  4  1  3  3  5  5  2  3  3  4  3  s  5  5  5
T-o  10  10  7  6  3  10  10  10  7  6  C  2  2  3  3
Housing  9  9  10  9  10  7  9  9  a  10  2  6  a  9  10
Clothing  12  13  13  13  11  13  1  13  13  13  6  9  9  a  9
Othor  Food  6  4  4  4  4  6  6  4  4  8  9  9  7  1  a
Other  Non-Food  3  a  9  12  13  1  0  7  9  12  4  10  12  12  12
Source:  Ahead  and  Stern  (1906)
Note: The  direction  of rofors  for  the  distorted  economy i  based  om  *quation(2)  modiftid  to reflect the
difference  betwoen  market  prices  and  shadow  price for  varying  coebinatlon  of  wage  (WCF)  and  asset
(ACf)  conversion  factors.Table  3a  Effective  Taxes  and  Proposed  Equal  Revenue  Reforms
Reforms
Commodity  Effective  I  Ia  II  IIa  III  IIIa
Tax
z  z  z  z  z  z  2
(1) Wheat  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(2) Rice  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3
(3) Pulses  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(4) Maize  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(5) Heat  0.5  0.0  0.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0
(6) Milk  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.0  5.0
(7) Vegetables/Fruit/Spices  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(8) Edoils  13.9  14.1  10.8  13.5  10.3  13.1  9.9
(9) Sugar  28.7  14.1  10.8  13.5  10.3  13.1  9.9
(10) Gur  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6
(11) Confectionary  18.5  14.1  16.7  13.5  16.1  13.1  15.5
(12) Tea  11.0  14.1  16.7  13.5  16.1  13.1  15.5
(13) Beverages  17.0  14.1  16.7  13.5  16.1  13.1  15.5
(14) Cigarettes  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0
(15) Bidis  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0
(16) Housing/Fuel/Light  10.0  14.1  10.8  13.5  10.3  13.1  9.9
(17) Clothing  9.0  14.1  16.7  13.5  16.1  13.1  15.5
(18) Hygiene/Medicine  25.0  14.1  10.8  13.5  10.3  13.1  9.9
(19) Recreation/Transport  9.0  14.1  16.7  13.5  16.1  13.1  15.5
(20) Other  Food  3.0  3.0  3.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0
(21) Other  Non-Food  15.0  14.1  16.7  13.5  16.1  13.1  15.5
Gainers  - Pakistan  60.87 62.76 61.86 62.95 54.59 61.57
Note I to  Illa  are  neutral  revenue  reforms  (+  or  - 0.22  due  to rounding  errors).
The  effective  taxes  reflect  the  tax  element in  the  price  of  the  21  commodity  groups,  and
the  proposed  tax  vectors are  shown for Reforms I-IIIa.  The  last  row  irndicates  the
proportion  of  households  that  gain  from  the  reform.Table  3b  Distribution  of  Gainers  for  Equal  Revenue  Reform
Percentage  of Gainers  in  each  Group
Reforms
Per  Capita  Mean  Rs/  No.  of  I  Ia  II  IIa  III  IIIa
Expenditure Capita  House-
Groups  Per  month  holds
1  98.7  828  57.00  59.18  64.98  64.25  71.01  71.86
2  126.5  829  61.52  64.29  69.72  69.72  71.29  74.67
3  143.4  829  59.83  64.05  66.47  67.31  64.78  70.69
4  155.9  829  66.95  67.31  71.53  70.45  67.31  73.34
5  168.1  828  64.01  68.72  70.65  71.01  66.30  73.31
6  181.4  829  68.15  71.17  72.74  72.98  64.90  72.26
7  193.7  829  66.83  70.57  70.69  72.14  61.52  71.65
8  205.7  829  66.22  71.17  70.69  73.94  59.35  70.81
9  221.0  828  71.26  72.83  72.22  73.91  60.39  72.34
10  232.0  829  68.88  73.46  69.36  74.31  57.66  69.96
11  249.8  829  62.97  67.67  65.14  67.19  54.89  65.50  1
12  264.3  829  64.54  70.81  64.66  68.15  53.68  64.41  Z
13  283.0  828  62.80  68.96  61.96  68.72  49.40  60.63  1
14  309.3  829  62.00  65.38  61.16  65.02  49.22  60.43
15  335.0  829  62.12  64.29  61.52  64.90  49.10  58.38
16  368.5  829  61.28  63.69  55.97  61.40  45.84  54.89
17  416.8  828  57.73  60.27  54.35  56.04  41.67  49.88
18  490.9  829  53.08  52.23  46.32  46.68  39.20  43.31
19  624.6  829  45.72  38.96  39.57  34.26  35.83  34.26
20  1158.2  829  34.62  20.14  27.50  16.65  28.47  18.82
Total  16575  60.87  62.76  61.86  62.95  54.59  61.57
Pakistan  Urban  7459  58.81  65.65  55.74  62.70  40.25  54.85
Pakistan  Rural  9116  62.56  60.39  66.86  63.15  66.32  67.07
Note: Groups  are  sorted  by  per-capita expenditure,  so  group 1 is  the  per-capita
expenditure  of the  poorest  52  while  group  20  is the  per-capita  expenditure  of
the  richest  52.
I to  IIIa  are  revenue  neutral  reforms  (+  or - 0.22  due  to rounding  errors).
See  Table  3a for  a  description  of  the  Reforms.- 16 -
is thus specified,  using the Stone-Geary  utility  function  which  underlies
the  LES,  for  each  expenditure  group  by the  expression:
Eh  _ (Mh _pl)  [  Pi  1  (Mh _P)  . (12)
Pi
where  ai (marginal  budget  shares),  and  - (supernumerary  consumption),  are
the  estimated  parameters  from  the  LES.  This  provides  a description  of the
method  involved  in the  analysis  of both  major  and  marginal  reforms  and the
associated  data  requirements.  The  analysis  for  Pakistan  follows.
3.  The  Analysis
The analysis of the effects of a tax reform  on households  in
different  circumstances  involves  a description  of the  existing  tax system,
so that  tax  and  price  changes  can  be  measured,  and  this  entails  an analysis
of the consumption  patterns  of households. For the second  requirement  a
household  expenditure  survey  is needed,  and, as stated  earlier,  we have
used  the  HIES  1984/85. Since  we have  16,575  households,  for  convenience  of
presentation  the  results  are  grouped  in terms  of  half-deciles  of  households
ranked  by per capita  expenditure,  the analysis  of gainers  and losers  is
conducted  for each individual  household.  Given that consumption  out of
home-grown  stocks  is an important  feature  especially  in rural  areas,  the
analysis  of the  effects  of price  changes  is carried  out  in terms  of actual
purchases  by households.
For the  description  of the  existing  tax  system  we draw  on earlier
work,  specifically  the  calculations  of 'effective  taxes'  at a disaggregated
level of commodity classification  (see i  aad  and Stern, 1986).  The- 17 -
analysis  is based on an 87-sector  economy-wide  input-output  table.  This
method  incorporates  problems  such  as evasion,  the  multiplicity  of announced
rates  for  various  commodity  groups  and so on, in that the  analysis  is at
the level of collections  rather than announced rates.  The 87-sector
effective  taxes  were merged  to 21-broad commodity groups to match
categories  that  we were able to identify  in the consumer  expenditure  data
in the 1984/5  HIES.  In the absence  of an input-output  table  for 1984/5,
and  since  the  Ahmad-Stern  effective  taxes  were  for  1975/6,  we updated  these
on the assumptions  (a) that the Leontief  inverse  would not have greatly
changed over the period to 1984/5; and (b) that administration  and/or
enforcement  was  similar  in the  two  years,  so  that nominal  rates
(collections  as a proportion  of the  base) could  be adjusted  by a factor
proportional  to the change in announced  rates.  The resulting  effective
taxes  are  shown  in  Table  3a.  Note that  the  input-output  information  is in
terms  of  purchaser  prices.
For the equivalent  variations  we needed the parameters  of the
Stone-Geary  utility  function,  and these  have  been estimated  using  the  ELES
method,  on a stepwise  basis  for 5 per capita  expenditure  groups  in urban
areas  and  a similar  number  in rural  areas  of Pakistan.
3.1  Equal  revenue  reforms
In this section  we examine  the  effects  of alternative  changes  in
the rate structure of indirect taxes,  keeping revenues  and quantities
constant. Thus  the  reforms  described  in  Table  3a  assume  that  teX'  - tvX#  -
R, where  R is  the  total  revenue  and  X' is  the  vector  of aggregate  purchases
in the  pre-reform  period (for  consumption  out of home grown  purchases  we- 18 -
assume  that  taxation  through  purchased  inputs,  if agriculture  is exempted,
will  be unchanged  in the  post-reform  period). Six  reforms  are  described  in
Table  3a.  The existing  effective  tax  vector  is replaced  by a combination
of excises  and  a  VAT, the  rates  of the  latter  being  chosen  after  fixing  the
excises  to yield  equal  revenues  in reforms  I, II and III.  In Reforms  Ia,
IIa and IIIa, we specify, in addition  a lower (fixed)  rate of VAT on
'essential'  items,  allowing  a higher  rate on the remaining  items  to yield
equal  revenue.
We assume that "gur", "cigarettes",  "bidis",  and "other  food"
would continue  to be taxed  as before,  with a combination  of excises  and
taxation  through  inputs  (if these  sectors  are treated  as exempt  from the
VAT,  as opposed  to  being  zero-rated,  the  tax  paid  on  purchased  inputs  could
not then  be offset  against  liability  for tax  on outputs,  or be refunded).
We expect that the VAT, with a combination  of exemptions  and enhanced
excises could approximate  existing effective taxes (much of the high
taxation  of cigarettes  is, however,  on account  of high nominal rates of
tax,  the  tax  element  through  inputs  being  rather  less  important).
For  Reform  I, replacing  the revenues  from all other  taxes,  apart
from the predetermined  excises,  yields a single  rate VAT of 14%.  For
Reform  II, we introduce  an additional  excise  of 5% on "meat",  which is,
from the analysis  of reform  and from  the point  of view of distributional
characteristics,  an attractive  candidate  for  additional  taxation  at higher
levels  of inequality  aversion. This  would  permit  a reduction  in the  VAT  of
half a percentage  point.  A  similar  excise  tax on "milk"  would permit
another  half a  percentage  point  in  the  VAT rate  (Reform  III).- 19  -
The  second  set  of assumptions  sets  a two-rate  VAT for  each  of the
three  reforms,  with the  lower  rate  of around  10%  for a set  of commodities
with high ranking distributional  characteristics:  "edible  oils",  "sugar"
(see  the discussion  in Bird,  1987,  concerning  the  taxation  if sugar,  which
had  traditionally  been  considered a  good candidate for additional
taxation),  "hygiene  and medicines",  and "housing,  fuel and light".  This
increases  the VAT rate on the remaining  commodities  by roughly  2% points
for  the  three  reforms  (see  Reforms  Ia,  IIa  and  MIIa).
It appears  that even Reform I, with the single  rate-VAT,  would
dominate  the existing  set of effective  taxes  on distributional  grounds,
with over 60%  of households  being  made  better  off.  The reduction  in VAT
rates,  combined  with a tax on "meat"  (Reform  II), appears  to make more
households  better  off,  although  the  additional  tax  on "milk"  combined  with
a further reduction  in VAT appears  to make fewer people  better off in
comparison  with the other  two reforms. However,  there  is a differential
impact on various deciles  of the size distribution.  From Table 3b we
observe  that  the  middle  expenditure  groups  (4  to 15  half deciles)  gain  most
from Reform I, and only for the top 10% do more than 50% of households
lose.  Reforms II and  III are more egalitarian, in that a greater
proportion  of the  poorest  household  groups  gain  than  correspondingly  richer
ones.  Thus Reform  III, in  which  only 54%  of households  gain,  relative  to
around  61%  for  both  Reforms  I and  II,  might  be preferred  by a distribution
conscious  policy  maker  in that  a greater  proportion  of the  bottom  20%, or
the  hard-core  poor are  made  better  off.
There are  important sectoral differences.  While more rural
households  in aggregate  are made better-off  than the urban,  more of the- 20 -
poorer  urban  households  gain,  particularly  for  Reforms  I and II.  We have
also  conducted  the  exercise  at the  Provincial  level,  although  these  results
are not presented  here.  It would appear that sectoral  differences  are
rather  more significant  than the regional  patterns  which roughly  reflect
the  patterns  of gainers  and  losers  at the  national  level.
The two-tier  VAT  makes  little  difference  in  rural  areas,  given  the
consumption patterns, and particularly  consumption  out of home-grown
stocks.  However, the effect of the two-tier  VAT  is that it sharply
increases the number of poor urban gainers and reduces the number of
gainers  among  the  top  5*.
The extent to which the poor or rich lose or gain, given that
there  are  gainers  and  losers  in  each  expenditure  category,  may  be seen  from
the  illustrative  diagram  of the  proportionate  gains  and  losses  for  Reforms
I and IIIa.  Since there are a large  number  of hidden  observations,  the
diagrams  have to be interpreted  in the context of the Text tables  and
calculations  of the average gain/loss  per household  group.  We observJe
that,  on average,  for the  equal  revenue  reforms  described  above,  it is the
top 10% to 20% that lose, although  there  are individual  households  that
gain  and lose in each  half decile. While  there  are losses  even among  the
poorest  household  groups,  these  are more than compensated  by gains  within
each half decile and, on average,  there is a net gain for the poorer
household  groups in all reforms.  This is most marked  with the two-tier
VAT,  Reform  IIIa  being  the  most  attractive  in  this  respect.
In practice,  agricultural  commodities  would  be exempt  rather  than
zero-rated. In some  cases  effective  subsidies  on inputs  might  well cancelD)iagram  1
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out the effects of taxes on inputs,  and the agricultural  sector could
effectively  be zero-rated,  for the most part,  with a possibility  of the
wheat subsidy being maintained in some form.  In this paper,  we have
assumed  no change  in the  price  of wheat.  Similarly,  the effective  tax  on
"gur"  is assumed  unchanged  (given  that  the  commodity  is  only taxed  through
the input structure) for most of the reform simulations.  Further a
movement  from  a positive  effective  tax  on "pulses"  and "maize"  to effective
zero-rating  for the reasons  mentioned  above,  may not be plausible  in all
circumstances. However,  recomputations  of gainers  and losers,  keeping  the
positive  effective  tax on maize and pulses  as the likely  consequence  of
exempting  this  sector,  rather  than  zero-rating  it,  does  not greatly  change
the  overall  results,  though  there  are fewer  gainers  on average,  down to
59% for Reform 1, as against almost 61% reported in Table 3a.  The
differences  are even less marked  for other  reforms  (details  available  on
request).
The practical problems in administering anything other than
exemption  for agriculture  by the VAT authorities  would  be enormous.  It
seems,  however,  that the administrative  constraints  here are not overly
inconsistent  with directions  of reform  which  might  be chosen  in ignorance
of the  constraints  and  this  conforms  broadly  with  directions  of reform  that
have  been identified  elsewhere  (see  Ahmad  and  Stern,  1986). The  profits  of
the cotton and rice-trading  corporations  on exports  might be additional
revenue  sources  that the  government  might  wish to retain,  and  which  would
not affect  the  picture  drawn  above.- 24 -
3.2  The  VAT  with additional  revenue
Various additional  revenue  possibilities  are described  in Table
4a.  In order  to  mitigate  the  effects  of increased  revenue  requirements,  we
have  opted  for  combinations  of two-tier  VAT structures,  supplemented  by the
usual  combination of excises, including the evaluation of additional
taxation  of "milk"  and "meat  products"  in  Reforms  V, VI,  VII  and IX.
Reform  IV is a likely  candidate for  adoption,  with the  lower  rate
of 10%  for  "edible  oils",  "tea",  "housing,  fuel  and  light",  and  "clothing",
combined  with a standard  rate of 20%.  If consumption  patterns  remain
constant,  this  would  lead  to  6.6%  additional  revenue,  and  50%  of  households
could  still  be made  better  off.
Reform  V maintains  the lower  rate 10%  VAT only on edible  oils,
with a 15% flat  rate  for  all  other  commodities,  combined  with an increased
excise  on "bidis"  (10%),  and  the 5% excises  on "meat"  and "milk  products".
While  this  could  raise  10%  in additional  revenue  from  indirect  taxes,  only
17% of households  benefit.  However,  the  poor  would  be less  affected  than
the relatively  well off,  and the average  loss for the  poorest  20% of the
population  would  be less  than  half  of one  percent  of their  expenditures,  as
against  1.6%  for  the top  5%.  Reform  VI is much  the  same  as  V, except  that
there  is now  a flat  rate of 15%  on all goods. An additional  5% excise  is
now  levied on  "confectionary" and  "beverages", which were desirable
candidates for additional taxation (see the Av in Table  2 and  the
distributional  characteristics  in  Table  1).  This  reform  could  raise  12% in
additional  revenue,  and yet around 10% of the population  would be made
better  off: largely  concentrated  in rural  areas  and  amongst  the  poorest  in- 25 -
the urban  areas.  The  average loss per  income  half decile is still
'progressive':  the richest  5% lose around  2% of their incomes,  and the
poorest  around  0.7  of one  percent  on average.
The  treatment of the "housing, fuel and light" consumption
category  is problematic  in terms  of tax classifications.  Fuel and light
for the  poorest  groups  consist  principally  of  wood and  kerosene;  which  are
relatively  lightly  taxed;  and for the richer  groups these include  inter
alia gas, petroleum and electricity.  Thus, whilst we might wish to
increase  the tax on the items  consumed  relatively  more by the rich, it
might  be neither  feasible  nor desirable  to increase  the tax  on firewood,
dung-cakes  or (to  some  extent)  kerosene. While,  in  previous  reforms  we had
allowed  the  tax on this sector  to vary with the  VAT, in  Reforms  VII, VIII
and  X we set  this to reflect  a set  of excises  that  would  yield  an average
of 5% (as  against  a base  case  of 10%,  with the  effective  tax  calculations).
While  revenue  increases  only  slightly  for  Reform  VII  over  Reform  VI,  with a
20% VAT compensating  for the reduced revenue from "housing, fuel and
light",  the  proportion  of households  gaining  goes  up to 23%.  Again these
are  concentrated  relatively  amongst  the  poorer  sections  of the  population.
A comparison  of Reform  VIII  relative  to  Reform  VII illustrates  the
effects of taxing "milk".  While this tax could potentially  add 3% in
revenue,  10%  of households  who could  have  actually  gained  from  Reform  VIII
would  be made worse off with the tax on "milk".  This is an example  of
varying  the tax on one commodity,  while  holding  others  constant  (subject,
of course,  to the  limitations  of the  assumptior.  of  unchanged  consumptions).
The  maximum  revenue  case  we consider  is that  of a 20%  VAT,  with excises  on
"housing, fuel and light", and  "bidis" held constant, but with theTable  4a  Effective  Taxes  and  Additional  Revenue  Reforms
Reforms
Commodity  Effective  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X
Tax
_Z  z  z  z  z  z  z
(1) Wheat  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(2) Rice  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  0.0  0.0
(3)  Pulses  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(4)  Maize  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(5)  Meat  0.5  0.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0
(6)  Milk  0.5  0.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  0.0  5.0  0.0
(7)  Vegetables/Fruit/Spices  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(8)  Edoils  13.9  10.0  10.0  15.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  15.0
(9) Sugar  28.7  20.0  15.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20.0
(10) Gur  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  0.0  1.6
(11) Confectionary  18.5  20.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20.0
(12) Tea  11.0  10.0  15.0  15.0  5.0  5.0  10.0  5.0
(13) Beverages  17.0  20.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20.0
(14) Cigarettes  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0  77.0 77.0
(15) Bidis  6.0  6.0  10.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  15.0
(16) Housing/Fuel/Light  10.0  10.0  15.0  15.0  5.0  5.0  10.0  5.0
(17) Clothing  9.0  10.0  15.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20.0
(18) HygieneiMedicine  25.0  20.0  15.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20.0
(19) Recreation/Transport  9.0  20.0  15.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20.0
(20) Other  Food  3.0  3.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  '.0  5.0  5.0
(21) Other  Non-Food  15.0  20.0  15.0  15.0  20.0  20.0  20.0 20-0
Gainers  - Pakistan  50.67 17.16  9.48 23.33 34.1  7.3  16.3
Additional  Revenue  - 6.6  9.8  12.2  13.1  10.2  19.8 14.5
Note Reforms  IV-X  reflect  a set  of  proposed tax  rates  that  would  replace  the  existing
"effective  tax  vector".  The  gainers represent  the proportion  of  households
benefitting  from  the  reform. The  estimates of  additional  revenue  are  based  on the
assumption  of  unchanged  consumptions,  and  are  therefore  only  representative  of  first
round  effects.Table  4b  Distribution  of  Gainers  for  Additional  Revenue  Reforms
Percentage  of Gainers  in  each  Group
Reforms
Per  Capita  Mean  Rs/  No.  of  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  x
Expenditure  Capita  House-
Groups  Per  month  holds
1  98.7  828  64.49  29.35  16.67  29.35  33.70  14.61  12.92
2  126.5  829  66.10  28.35  14.48  30.16  36.31  13.63  15.20
3  143.4  829  66.95  22.68  13.63  28.11  36.79  11.58  14.23
4  155.9  829  60.43  27.02  14.11  29.19  40.05  12.30  15.92
5  168.1  828  64.49  23.55  11.59  26.81  40.46  8.70  14.86
6  181.4  829  63.21  22.32  12.91  29.19  43.18  10.62  19.30
7  193.7  829  61.88  20.39  11.82  28.11  40.29  9.41  19.42
8  205.7  829  62.00  19.54  10.62  26.66  40.17  6.51  18.34
9  221.0  828  58.70  19.08  9.54  27.66  40.70  8.21  18.36
10  232.0  829  58.75  16.53  8.08  25.57  39.20  7.24  18.82
11  249.8  829  54.40  15.08  7.72  24.73  37.15  6.63  18.70
12  264.3  829  52.11  16.41  8.93  25.09  38.60  6.88  19.30
13  283.0  828  51.81  16.43  9.66  21.98  36.23  6.88  19.20
14  309.3  829  47.17  12.79  7.72  20.51  33.78  4.83  16.16
15  335.0  929  45.60  12.79  7.96  20.63  33.41  4.95  17.49
16  368.5  829  40.41  10.01  5.67  18.82  30.04  4.34  17.01
17  416.8  828  38.04  11.11  5.43  17.39  29.11  3.62  14.49
18  490.9  829  28.83  8.81  5.31  15.32  23.64  2.05  14.84
19  624.6  829  19.42  6.76  4.34  12.18  17.37  0.97  12.42
20  1158.2  829  8.69  4.34  3.50  9.17  11.82  1.69  9.53
Total  16575  50.67  17.16  9.48  23.33  34.10  7.28  16.33
Pakistan  Urban  7459  48.77  9.29  4.21  23.65  38.79  5.42  21.38
Pakistan  Rural  9116  52.23  23.61  13.80  23.07  30.2'  8.81  12.19
Note: Groups  are  sorted  by per-capita  expenditure,  so  group 1 is  the  per-capita
expenditure  of  the  poorest  52  while  group  20  is the  per-capita  expenditure  of
the  richest  5Z.
See  Table  4a  for  a  description  of the  Reforms.- 28 -
effective  tax on "edible  oils" reduced  to a 5% excise,  in line  with that
proposed for  "milk" and "meat".  This could raise 20% in additional
revenue,  but most people  would  be affected,  albeit  the rich  more than  the
poor.
The estimates  of additional  revenue  range from 6% (Reform  IV) to
just under 20% (Reform  IX) over the existing  effective  tax vector.  The
effective taxes represent  the tax element in the price of domestically
produced goods and services, including  the effects  of the taxation  of
imported  materials  used in the  production  of such goods.  Thus taking  the
existing  set  of domestic  indirect  taxes  only (6%  of GDP in recent  years)
would  underestimate  the  base of the  effective  tax  calculations.  Note that
total  indirect  taxes  include  duties  on imported  goods  mainly  on inputs,  in
addition to a proportion  on final goods, as well as taxes on domestic
inputs  and  final  goods.  Since  total  indirect  taxes  have been  around  11.5%
of GDP,  a rough  calculation  would  suggest  that  20%  additional  indirect  tax
revenue  could  yield  upto 2%  of GDP.  Rate  changes  are  part of the  story,
and in practice  much will depend  on what decisions  are taken  to determine
the  base and  coverage  of the  new tax:  whether  it is  upto the  retail  stage,
or is  restricted  to the  wholesale  or  manufacturers'  and  importers'  stages.
3.3  Major  Price  Changes
While the analysis  of Sections  3.1 and 3.2  had the advantage  of
being  based  on actual  consumptions  and demand  patterns,  the  assumptian  of
unchanged  consumption  in the face of clearly  non-marginal  price changes,
particularly  in the revenue  raising  case,  is less  than  satisfactory.  Here
we examine  the  story  of the  earlier  sections  with  the  use  of fitted  demandsTable 5a:  Pakistan  Equivalent  Variations
(Changes  in Per Capita Consumption  Rs/month)
Reforms
Half
Deciles  I  Ia  II  IIa  III  IIIa  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII:  IX  X
IGI  -1.458  .231  -1.207  .429  -1.291  .350  .777  -2.139  -2.394  2.098  2.435  -.076  1.904
IG2  -1.445  .381  -1.207  .557  -1.386  .397  .787  -2.499  -2.810  1.956  2.453  -.520  1.845
1I3  -1.437  .472  -1.207  .634  -1.443  .425  .792  -2.717  -3.062  1.871  2.464  -.788  1.809
IC4  -1.431  .540  -1.208  .692  -1.486  .446  .797  -2.879  -3.250  1.807  2.472  -.988  1.783
IG5  -1.714  .848  -1.608  .874  -2.065  .432  1.563  -3.425  -3.834  2.492  3.33C  -.695  2.553
IG6  -1.739  .868  -1.626  .895  -2.090  .456  1.482  -3.593  -4.037  2.410  3.288  -.925  2.472
IG7  -1.761  .887  -1.643  .915  -2.112  .477  1.409  -3.747  -4.224  2.334  3.250  -1.137  2.398
18  -1.783  .905  -1.660  .934  -2.135  .499  1.336  -3.898  -4.407  2.259  3.212  -1.344  2.326
IG9  -1.510  1.725  -1.688  1.453  -2.553  .596  2.622  -4.061  -4.768  2.574  3.892  -1.030  2.777
I010  -1.542  1.739  -1.692  1.491  -2.571  .628  2.513  -4.222  -4.967  2.528  3.895  -1.247  2.731
IGII  -1.587  1.759  -1.697  1.544  -2.596  .674  2.360  -4.449  -5.249  2.464  3.900  -1.554  2.668
IG12  -1.626  1.776  -1.702  1.590  -2.618  .713  2.228  -4.644  -5.491  2.408  3.904  -1.817  2.613
IG13  -2.767  1.044  -2.848  .826  -3.559  .161  1.749  -6.040  -6.761  2.684  4.060  -2.447  2.995
IG14  -2.894  .974  -2.992  .731  -3.747  .040  1.482  -6.542  -7.340  2.400  3.893  -3.081  2.764
IIS  -3.018  .906  -3.133  .638  -3.930  -.077  1.221  -7.030  -7.902  2.122  3.730  -3.697  2.539
IG16  -3.180  .818  -3.316  .517  -4.169  -.230  .881 -7.667  -8.636  1.761  3.517  -4.501  2.246
IC17  -5.309  1.177  -5.621  .653  -6.427  -.081  2.658  -10.414 -11.501  5.100  6.885  -3.687  5.595
IG18  -6.511  -.288  -6.669  -.682  -7.312  -1.178  .179  -12.431  -13.612  2.990  4.858  -6.756  3.524
IG19  -8.683  -2.935  -8.561  -3.094  -8.911  -3.162  -4.301  -16.074  -17.427  -.822  1.195  -12.300  -.217
120  -17.347 -13.493 -16.111 -12.716  -15.292  -11.073  -22.174  -30.609  -32.643  -16.028  -13.414  -34.418 -15.143
Note:  The equivalent  variations  are estimated  using piece-wise linear  ELES estimates for rural and
urban households (see  equation 11 and text).Table  5b:  Pakistan Equivalent  Variations
(Changes  in  Proportions  of  Per  Capita  Consumption)
Reforms
Half
Deciles  I  la  II  lIa  III  IIIa  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X
IG1  -. 015  .002  -. 012  .004  -. 013  .004  .008  -. 022  -. 024  .021  .025  -. 001  .019
IG2  -. 011  .003  -. 010  .004  -. 011  .003  .006  -. 020  -. 022  .015  .019  -. 004  .015
IC3  -. 010  .003  -. 008  .004  -. 010  .003  .006  -. 019  -. 021  .013  .017  -. 005  .013
IG4  -. 009  .003  -. 008  .004  -. 010  .003  .005  -. 018  -. 021  .012  .016  -. 006  .011
ICS  -. 010  .005  -. 010  .005  -. 012  .003  .009  -. 020  -. 023  .015  .020  -. 004  .015
IC6  -. 010  .005  -. 009  .005  -. 012  .003  .008  -.020  -.022  .0!3  .018  -. 005  .014
IC7  -. 009  .005  -. 008  .005  -. 011  .002  .007  -. 019  -. 022  .012  .017  -. 006  .012
1C8  -. 009  .004  -.008  .005  -. 010  .002  .006  -.019  -. 021  .011  .01F  -. 007  .011
IG9  -. 007  .008  -.008  .007  -. 012  .003  .012  -. 018  -. 022  .012  .018  -. 005  .013
C101  -. 007  .007  -.007  .006  -. 011  .003  .011  -. 018  -. 021  .011  .017  -.005  .012
IG11  -. 006  .007  -.007  .006  -. 010  .003  .009  -. 018  -. 021  .010  .016  -. 006  .011
IC12  -. 006  .007  -.006  .006  -. 010  .003  .008  -. 018  -. 021  .009  .015  -.007  .010
IG13  -. 010  .004  -.010  .003  -. 013  .001  .006  -. 021  -. 024  .009  .014  -. 009  .011
IG14  -. 009  .003  -.010  .002  -. 012  .000  .005  -. 021  -. 024  .008  .013  -. 010  .009
IG15  -. 009  .003  -.009  .002  -. 012  .000  .004  -. 021  -. 024  .006  .011  -. 011  .008
IC16  -. 009  .002  -. 009  .001  -. 011  -. 001  .002  -. 021  -. 023  .005  .010  -. 012  .006
1G17  -. 013  .003  -.013  .002  -. 015  .000  .006  -. 025  -. 028  .012  .017  -. 009  .013
1G18  -. 013  -. 001  -.014  -. 001  -. 015  -.002  .000  -. 025  -. 028  .006  .010  -. 014  .007
1G19  -. 014  -.005  -. 014  -. 005  -. 014  -.005  -. 007  -. 026  -. 028  -. 001  .002  -. 020  .000
IG20  -. 015  -. 012  -. 014  -. 011  -. 013  -.010  -. 019  -. 026  -. 028  -. 014  -. 012  -. 030  -. 013
See  Note  to  Table  5a.- 31 -
and the estimation  of equivalent  variations  for  all the  reforms  considered
above. The  results  are  presented  in  Tables  5 a and  b for  Pakistan.
It is apparent  that the equivalent  variations,  for the "revenue
neutral"  though  more differentiated  tax  changes  (Reforms  Ia,  IIa  and IIIa)
give similar results to the first-order  approximations  of gainers and
losers:  with Reform  IIIa being the  most progressive,  and the others  with
the  middle  expenditure  groups  gaining  more than  the  poorest,  but with the
richest  being  made worse  off.  However,  with the  proportional  VAT (Reforms
I, II and III), all groups  are made worse-off  on average.  The middle
income  groups  are le s affected  in terms  of their income  levels  than the
poorest  or  the  richest  for  Reforms  I and  II, and all  groups are
proportionally  hit by Reform  III.  Clearly,  in such cases  the  reforms  are
not revenue  neutral. The  reason  for the  apparent  confirmation  in the  two-
tier  case lies in that the changes  in prices  are small  relative  to those
involved  in the  proportional  VAT  cases.
The  equivalent  variations  are  estimated  on the  basis  of step-wise
ELES  parameters  evaluated  for  five  sets  of  per-capita  expenditure  groups  at
the  group  means,  for  urban  and  rural  areas  respectively.  The  use  of these
parameters  generates  average  gains  and losses  for each expenditure  group.
This is  similar  to  the  average  gain  or loss  estimated  for  each  group  in the
first  approximations  described  in  previous  sections. While  it is  possible,
in principle, to generate a distribution  of such gains and losses  by
household,  the  usefulness  of such  an exercise  is limited  by the fact that
the demand  parameters  are group-specific  rather  than  household  specific.
For the  purposes  of exposition,  therefore,  we concentrate on the average
gain/loss  per expenditure  group,  in assessing  the effects  of non-marginal
tax  changes.- 32 -
One of the  most interesting  cases  yielding  additional  revenue  in
the first order approximations  is that of Reform IV.  The first order
approximations  suggested  that 50% of households  would  be made better off
with this tax  change. The  equivalent  variations  also  confirm  that  this is
likely  to  be a  progressive  reform. A substantial  element  in the  gains  made
at the lower deciles of the size distribution  relate  to the relatively
favourable  treatment  of "edible  oils",  "tea"  and  "housing  fuel  and light",
all  commodities  which  have  high ranking  distributional  characteristics  (we
have noted the )roblem  with the treatment  of the  housing fuel and light
sector).  Consequently,  gains are displayed  in all reforms in which the
taxation of such goods is restricted,  and illustrated  in addition  by
Reforms  VII,  VIII and  X.  Given  that  additional  taxation  is  not imposed  on
"housing  fuel  and  light"  in Reform  X, and the  excises  on "edible  oils"  are
reduced,  the equivalent  variations  for this reform  suggest  a relatively
progressive  sharing  of the burden of the additional  revenues,  one that
would  be preferable  to  that  imposed  by the  equal  revenue  Reform  I.
4.  Concluding  Remarks
We have seen the  value of the analysis  of reform  in guiding  the
choice  of  a desirable  structure  of indirect  taxation. For  policy  makers  we
have illustrated  how the  evaluation  of directions  of reform  might  proceed,
without  overly  complicated  models  of the  economy,  and  with the  sort  of data
that  is  now increasingly  available  (e.g.  the  programme  of  household  surveys
being conducted by various divisions of the World Bank, and by other
international  agencies,  in addition  to national  surveys  conducted  by many
Statistical  Offices  around  the  world).- 33 -
Countries  such as  Pakistan  relying  on  a narrow  tax base,
consisting  primarily  of tariffs  on a limited  range of goods  and specific
excises  on domestic  manufacturing,  have  difficulty  in  ensuring  that  the  tax
system  keeps  pace with tne  growth  in  national  income  and activity  without
frequent discretionary  changes.  Such changes increase  the distortions
caused  by cascading  with  adverse  effects  on exports,  as  well as  undesirable
consequences  for poor households. A correctly  designed  consumption-based
tax  instrument  such  as the  VAT  has the  potential  to increase  the tax  base,
remove  production  distortions,  and is potentially  attractive  in terms  of
distributional consequences.  While  country-specific administrative
capabilities  need to be addressed  in the  design  of alternate  tax systems,
it is likely  that  the  VAT would  in  general  be preferable  to a system  of ad
valorem  retail  sales  taxation. The latter  would  also  avoid  cascading,  but
may  have  a more  uncertain  revenue  yield  than  the  VAT,  which  is collected  at
each stage in the production  process  and not just at the retail level.
Indeed  some  of the  options  for  a VAT for  developing  countries  suggest  the
adoption,  in the first  instance,  of a VAT at the import  and  manufacturing
stages,  extending  to the wholesale  level.  Further  advantages  of a VAT
include  a  better  flow  of information  that  helps  in the  collection  of income
and corporation  taxes (see Gil Diaz, 1987), and fewer distortions  in
production  decision  making.
If it is considered  important  to  protect  the  poor,  in addition  to
-aising  revenues,  then  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  there  are  policy  tools
and especially tax instruments  which could be designed to meet this
objective.- 34 -
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